Florida law permits trial courts to temporarily modify (and suspend) child custody and time-sharing without prior notice in “emergencies.” Caselaw defines “emergencies” as threats of physical harm or imminent removal from the state. In Capps (December 2025), the Fourth DCA recognized that “substantial emotional abuse or trauma” may also qualify as an emergency.

The case arose from a contentious marriage dissolution proceeding. Initially, both parents were granted shared parental responsibility and timesharing. However, the situation escalated when the mother filed an emergency motion alleging harm by the father, including allegations of child drug exposure and child sexual abuse.

Shortly thereafter, the father filed a sworn emergency motion claiming the mother fabricated allegations and subjected the children to repeated, unnecessary invasive examinations, including drug testing and pelvic examinations, and that she made repetitive abuse reports that resulted in police and DCF involvement. The GAL corroborated the children were exposed to unnecessary medical and forensic evaluations and investigations. The trial court found that the mother’s actions were causing severe emotional trauma to the children. The trial court entered a temporary emergency order that restricted the mother’s contact with the children to supervised time-sharing.

The Fourth DCA affirmed the trial court’s emergency order pending a full evidentiary hearing. The Fourth DCA emphasized that its decision does not predetermine the outcome of the pending evidentiary hearing but validates the trial court’s authority to act promptly in emergencies, which may include situations in which children are exposed to emotional or psychological harm.

The case is notable because it explicitly recognizes mental and psychological harm as a basis for the domestic relations court to enter temporary, emergency orders on the topic of child time-sharing.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

This case involved a dispute between husband and wife over the sale proceeds from the marital home that the parties retained after divorce. The parties purchased a home during their marriage. They subsequently divorced and deferred the sale of the jointly-deeded marital home until an unspecified future date. Their divorce final judgment was entered in 2007 and ratified a marital settlement agreement drafted by the parties. The marital settlement agreement required the former wife to make the ongoing mortgage payments. The MSA also provided that any future sale proceeds from a deferred sale would be split 60/40 in her favor.

For 17 years, the former wife paid all property-related expenses, including taxes, insurance, and maintenance. She occasionally rented the home and did not share the rents she received with the former husband. The husband did not contribute to the carrying costs of the home.

When they agreed to sell in 2021, the former husband claimed his 40% share of the proceeds. The former wife refused, seeking reimbursement for half of the property-related expenses she had been covering after their divorce final judgment was entered.

The issue before the court was whether a co-owner who pays all property expenses after divorce has a right to reimbursement when the property is sold.

The First DCA began by reviewing general property law. Under F.S. §689.15, property held as “tenancy by the entirety” converts to a “tenancy in common” after entry of a divorce final judgment. Co-tenants generally share responsibility for property expenses. In this particular case, the MSA relieved the former husband of mortgage payments but was silent on other costs. Therefore, the court found the former husband remains liable for his share of non-mortgage expenses.

The First DCA also noted that the default rule providing for equal sharing of costs also applies to income, and that half the rental income the former wife received must be offset against the former husband’s half of the non-mortgage expenses.

This case illustrates that clarity matters when drafting marital settlement agreements. Jointly owned property can create long-term financial entanglements after divorce. Marital settlement agreements should be drafted with precision to avoid costly disputes years later.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

When dividing assets in a Florida divorce, one common question is whether a spouse that uses nonmarital funds to pay marital expenses converts the asset from non-marital to marital. The recent case of Rose v. Rose (November 2025) provides important guidance.

In Rose, the husband owned a construction company that the court classified as nonmarital property. During the marriage, he used the company’s accounts to pay personal and marital expenses. The trial court ruled that this use converted part of the business into a marital asset and awarded his wife half the business value.

The Second DCA reversed the trial court, holding that the use of nonmarital funds for marital expenses does not automatically convert the asset into marital property. Only when nonmarital funds are mixed with marital funds (e.g., deposited into a joint account) or there is clear intent to gift does the classification change.

Florida law is clear: Payment of marital expenses with nonmarital funds does not change ownership classification unless commingling or gifting occurs. It is important to keep marital and non-marital accounts separate to avoid commingling.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

But not all divorces are quick and easy. If spouses don’t have an agreement on key issues, the divorce is considered contested, which significantly slows down the process. Contested divorces often involve court hearings, mediation, and extensive negotiation, sometimes stretching the timeline to several months or even over a year. Child custody disputes or complex financial assets can add additional layers of time and complexity. Plus, backlogs in the court system can lengthen the timeline to get to the final judgment. It’s not unusual for litigants to wait for months for hearing times in Orlando.

Whether your divorce takes a few weeks or more than a year, it’s important to stay informed and organized. Working with an attorney or mediator can help streamline the process, and being proactive about paperwork and communication with your spouse can avoid unnecessary delays. Every divorce is different, but understanding the typical timeline in Florida can help you navigate this life transition with a little more clarity and a lot more confidence.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently addressed this issue and held that, when evaluating attorney’s fees, the determination of financial need must be made after considering the effects of equitable distribution and any alimony awards. In Ramakrishnan (April 25, 2025), the appellate court reversed a trial court order requiring the husband to pay $20,000 toward the wife’s attorney’s fees. Under Florida law, fee awards depend on one spouse’s need and the other’s ability to pay. However, the trial court’s own findings showed that the parties received an equal distribution of marital assets and had comparable incomes once the awarded alimony was factored into their net income. Because both parties ultimately had nearly equal financial resources, the appellate court determined that the attorney’s fee award was not justified.

If you have questions about how courts evaluate financial need in divorce cases, an experienced alimony attorney in Orlando can help you understand how issues such as spousal support, equitable distribution, and attorney’s fees may affect your case. For guidance with alimony, divorce, child support, and other family law matters, contact DeVoe Law Firm today.

Unknown to the former wife at the time of signing, the QDRO included a clause stating she waived any rights to benefits the former husband would receive under the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), a component of the FRS. This waiver was not part of the original marital settlement agreement, and the former wife did not become aware of it until 2024. She then filed a motion for relief from the QDRO under Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(a), which allows for correction of clerical mistakes in judgments or orders at any time, either on the court’s own initiative or on a party’s motion.

The trial court granted her motion, finding that there was no evidence she had knowingly agreed to waive her entitlement to DROP benefits. The former husband appealed the decision, arguing that the error was not clerical but instead a substantive modification of the original order, and therefore not subject to correction under Rule 12.540(a). The Fourth District Court of Appeal (DCA) reviewed the matter and agreed with the former husband’s interpretation of the rule.

The appellate court clarified that clerical mistakes refer only to accidental slips or omissions that do not alter the substance of a court’s judgment. Substantive changes, such as those that impact the rights and obligations of the parties, must be addressed under Rule 12.540(b), which permits relief from judgments due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, but only if filed within one year of the original judgment’s entry. Since the former wife’s motion came nearly three years after the QDRO was entered, her request was untimely under subsection (b). The appellate court held that her claim involved a substantive legal issue, not a clerical error, and therefore the trial court lacked authority to modify the QDRO under subsection (a). As a result, the Fourth DCA reversed the lower court’s decision.

This case serves as a cautionary tale for litigants and attorneys, emphasizing the necessity of thoroughly reviewing all documents submitted to the court before signing. It illustrates how overlooking seemingly small details in legal documents can have significant long-term consequences. It also reinforces the importance of understanding procedural rules governing the correction of court orders, particularly the strict time limits associated with seeking relief for substantive mistakes.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

In Shouman, the former wife appealed the trial court’s final judgment that denied her request for alimony. The Sixth DCA found that F.S. 61.08(2) requires a two-step process to determine whether alimony should be awarded.

First, the court must determine if there is an actual need for alimony on one hand and the ability to pay it on the other, basing this determination strictly on the parties’ net incomes after deducting reasonable expenses.

If both need and ability to pay are established, the second step involves deciding the type, amount, and duration of alimony, taking into account various statutory factors specified in F.S. 61.08(2), such as age, health, financial resources, earning capacity, education, and employment prospects.

The Sixth District found that the trial court improperly combined the two steps by finding the former wife proved need for alimony in the amount of $4,000, but at the same time finding she did not have need because she was able-bodied, employable, and had received substantial assets through equitable distribution—factors that are relevant only in the second step of the statutory analysis. By using these second-step considerations to nullify a clear finding of need in the first step, the trial court deviated from the correct legal procedure.

Also notable, the Sixth District held that the trial court erred by finding that the former husband lacked ability to pay. The trial court found that the former husband had a net monthly income of $2,980.58 which was less than his monthly deficit of approximately $3,800 based on his listed, reasonable expenses. However, the trial court failed to recognize that the former husband’s expenses were actually paid by his business. Therefore, his entire income constituted surplus funds, and he indeed had the ability to pay alimony.

The Sixth District remanded to the trial court for a proper reassessment of alimony consistent with the statutory framework, as well as a reassessment of child support since alimony impacts the calculation of child support.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

The trial court ended up equally distributing the marital assets and liabilities, except for the retirement accounts of the parties. The husband kept his retirement account with a balance of $1,078,810. The wife kept her retirement account with a balance of $803,257. The trial court referenced the wife’s destruction of the husband’s memorabilia collection to justify the unequal distribution of $275,553 in favor of the husband.

The Third District noted that the equitable distribution statutes does not consider the intentional destruction of nonmarital property, but that the trial court could properly consider the wife’s conduct as part of the broad catchall of “other factors necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.” However, the Third District agreed with the wife’s argument that “the sentimental interest of one party in . . . property cannot take priority over financial fairness to the other party.” The Third District reversed and remanded for the trial court to reduce the husband’s unequal distribution to $14,500, which is the value he assessed the memorabilia in his financial affidavit.

Personally I think the trial court only erred by lowballing the husband’s Star Wars collection. But if you can’t get sentimental value for the Millenium Falcon, then forget about those Hummels; Elvis memorabilia, and bone china.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

In Kiswani v. Hafza (February 14, 2025), the trial court made the former wife’s timesharing contingent on recommendations from medical professionals and allowing the minor child’s therapist “to determine if, when and the parameters of telephonic and/or video contact” should occur between the former wife and the minor child. Although the trial court reserved authority to make the final decision on timesharing, the former wife’s timesharing could not resume absent a stamp of approval from third parties. The Fifth District found this type of delegation of authority to be legally impermissible, even with the retention of veto power. The Fifth District reversed the trial court and remanded for a timesharing plan that complies with legal standards.

There are a fair number of cases that prohibit the trial court from delegating timesharing decisions to third parties. Kiswani is helpful by going as a step further to make clear that retention of “veto power” does not cure otherwise impermissible delegation of judicial responsibility.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

In an initial determination of child support, whether in a paternity action, dissolution of marriage action, or petition for support during the marriage, the court has discretion to award child support retroactive to the date when the parents did not reside together in the same household with the child, not to exceed a period of 24 months preceding the filing of the petition, regardless of whether that date precedes the filing of the petition.

In Ramirez v. Gregory (February 14, 2025), the Fifth District held that retroactive child support must be specifically pleaded. The decision is consistent with the longstanding principle that the court lacks jurisdiction to enter any judgment on an issue not raised by the pleadings, unless the issue is tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. The case includes a useful practice pointer on handling unnoticed issues. The trial attorney should object, which preserve the issue for appeal, but then may proceed to enter evidence on the unnoticed issue.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.