In Dunn, the husband took the children and relocated from Florida to live with his parents in Tennessee. This ocurred during the irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage, but before divorce was filed. His wife quickly filed a divorce and requested an emergency pickup order for return of the children, which the trial court granted.

The husband appealed, arguing that F.S. 61.13001, Florida’s relocation statute, doesn’t prohibit relocation before divorce is filed. The Third DCA agreed, noting the law applies only after a time-sharing order has been ordered, or a pending action has been filed.

However, the court held a that the trial court had discretion to order a parenting plan that included return of the children if determined to be in the best interests of the children under F.S. 61.13(2)(a).

The Fourth DCA stayed the pickup order and remanded for the trial court to hold a hearing on whether returning the children serves their best interests.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

In Wilson, the wife owned a home before marriage, jointly with her father. During the marriage, marital funds were used for mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance. The trial court calculated a $72,000 marital interest in the property as a result of these expenses, without evidence that they increased the home’s value.

The Second DCA reversed the trial court. The Second DCA found that F.S. 61.075(6)(a)(1)(b) governs the issue of active appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting from the expenditure of marital funds. According to that statute, only value-enhancing contributions are considered when determining valuation for distribution purposes. Marital contributions that merely maintain the property, such as taxes and insurance, do not add to property value and do not create marital equity. The Second DCA directed the trial court to reconsider whether the mortgage paydown increased the equity in the home, and if so, by how much. The Second DCA further held that the amount subject to distribution to husband and wife should only be half of the enhanced value due to the wife’s shared ownership of the non-marital home with her father.

In some ways, this case seems to be much ado about nothing. A spouse who has made non-value enhancing contributions to non-marital property has recourse under a different statute. In Cole v. Robert (1993), the Fourth DCA held that where one spouse has paid significant expenses on the property of another spouse, even if they do not enhance the value of the property, the trial court may consider those payments in determining whether there is a justification for an unequal distribution of marital assets under F.S. 61.075(1)(g). Note that the marital estate appears to be limited to recovering the non-value enhancing marital contributions that were actually expended, without any interest, making the non-consenting spouse in the marital estate an unwilling, unpaid creditor. Not a perfect answer, but better than nothing.

What is puzzling about this case is that none of the above legal authority provides for distribution of passive appreciation that accrued during the time that marital funds were used to pay the non-marital mortgage. Neither the husband’s attorney nor the court addressed passive appreciation owed to the marital estate under the coverture formula set forth in F.S. 61.075(6)(a)(1)(c). Nonetheless, this case is helpful in distinguishing between value enhancing, active appreciation distributable to the marital estate under F.S. 61.075(6)(a)(1)(b) and non-value enhancing contributions that may be distributable under F.S. 61.075(1)(g).

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, sets out the timelines by which certain hearings are required to be held. One of the most important hearings is the case plan acceptance hearing in which the court determines the details of the parent’s case plan, such as services, specific providers, and the parent’s part of financial responsibility, if any.

Under Chapter 39, it can take 60 days or more to get to a case plan acceptance hearing. That means parents are often left with 10 months or less to complete their case plan services. Because the parent is on a deadline to complete tasks, it is crucial that a parent receive an actionable case plan as soon as possible. A demand for early filing of the dependency petition can expedite the initial hearings in a dependency case and help parents get to a case plan acceptance hearing and a court-approved case plan faster.

A demand for early filing is authorized by F.S. 39.501(4) and F.S. 39.506(1). In Orlando, dependency arraignments are routinely set not more than 14 days from shelter with an early filing demand. Without a demand, the arraignment wouldn’t be scheduled until up to 28 days after shelter (or longer if the parent does not object to the court scheduling the hearing outside statutory time frames).

Click here for the form I use to Demand Early Filing of a Dependency Petition.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

But here’s a twist: in Florida, there’s no such thing as a “legal separation.” That’s right—Florida law doesn’t offer (or require) a formal process for legal separation like some other states. The most similar solution that Florida offers is petitioning for “support unconnected with dissolution,” which allows a spouse to request things like child support or alimony without actually filing for divorce. It’s a way to get legal and financial protections while still remaining legally married.

So why might a couple choose separation over divorce? Some want time to heal or work things out without fully ending the marriage. Others may need to stay married for religious reasons or to keep certain benefits, like health insurance. Whatever the reason, it’s important to know your legal options. In Florida, that means thinking outside the traditional separation box.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

So, what could tip the scales away from an even split? Florida courts consider a range of factors: the length of the marriage, each spouse’s financial situation, contributions to the household (both financial and non-financial), and even whether one spouse intentionally wasted or hid assets. In short, the goal is fairness, not necessarily equality. That means one spouse might end up with more or less, especially if special needs or unique circumstances are at play.

The good news is that spouses don’t have to leave these decisions to a judge. Many litigants reach a mutual agreement through mediation based on their individual sense of fairness. The court is almost always willing to ratify a private agreement on distribution of marital property. This can save time and avoid the stress and cost of contested hearings and trial.

The best starting point for a negotiated compromise is understanding how the law would apply the facts in your case and how a judge would likely decide issues. A skilled attorney who is knowledgeable in divorce law, procedure, and local practice can inform you and let you know your options – and help you get to an agreeable settlement more quickly. Every divorce is different, but understanding Florida’s rules can help you prepare, protect your rights, and move forward with confidence.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently addressed this issue and held that, when evaluating attorney’s fees, the determination of financial need must be made after considering the effects of equitable distribution and any alimony awards. In Ramakrishnan (April 25, 2025), the appellate court reversed a trial court order requiring the husband to pay $20,000 toward the wife’s attorney’s fees. Under Florida law, fee awards depend on one spouse’s need and the other’s ability to pay. However, the trial court’s own findings showed that the parties received an equal distribution of marital assets and had comparable incomes once the awarded alimony was factored into their net income. Because both parties ultimately had nearly equal financial resources, the appellate court determined that the attorney’s fee award was not justified.

If you have questions about how courts evaluate financial need in divorce cases, an experienced alimony attorney in Orlando can help you understand how issues such as spousal support, equitable distribution, and attorney’s fees may affect your case. For guidance with alimony, divorce, child support, and other family law matters, contact DeVoe Law Firm today.

Unknown to the former wife at the time of signing, the QDRO included a clause stating she waived any rights to benefits the former husband would receive under the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), a component of the FRS. This waiver was not part of the original marital settlement agreement, and the former wife did not become aware of it until 2024. She then filed a motion for relief from the QDRO under Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(a), which allows for correction of clerical mistakes in judgments or orders at any time, either on the court’s own initiative or on a party’s motion.

The trial court granted her motion, finding that there was no evidence she had knowingly agreed to waive her entitlement to DROP benefits. The former husband appealed the decision, arguing that the error was not clerical but instead a substantive modification of the original order, and therefore not subject to correction under Rule 12.540(a). The Fourth District Court of Appeal (DCA) reviewed the matter and agreed with the former husband’s interpretation of the rule.

The appellate court clarified that clerical mistakes refer only to accidental slips or omissions that do not alter the substance of a court’s judgment. Substantive changes, such as those that impact the rights and obligations of the parties, must be addressed under Rule 12.540(b), which permits relief from judgments due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, but only if filed within one year of the original judgment’s entry. Since the former wife’s motion came nearly three years after the QDRO was entered, her request was untimely under subsection (b). The appellate court held that her claim involved a substantive legal issue, not a clerical error, and therefore the trial court lacked authority to modify the QDRO under subsection (a). As a result, the Fourth DCA reversed the lower court’s decision.

This case serves as a cautionary tale for litigants and attorneys, emphasizing the necessity of thoroughly reviewing all documents submitted to the court before signing. It illustrates how overlooking seemingly small details in legal documents can have significant long-term consequences. It also reinforces the importance of understanding procedural rules governing the correction of court orders, particularly the strict time limits associated with seeking relief for substantive mistakes.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

In Kiswani v. Hafza (February 14, 2025), the trial court made the former wife’s timesharing contingent on recommendations from medical professionals and allowing the minor child’s therapist “to determine if, when and the parameters of telephonic and/or video contact” should occur between the former wife and the minor child. Although the trial court reserved authority to make the final decision on timesharing, the former wife’s timesharing could not resume absent a stamp of approval from third parties. The Fifth District found this type of delegation of authority to be legally impermissible, even with the retention of veto power. The Fifth District reversed the trial court and remanded for a timesharing plan that complies with legal standards.

There are a fair number of cases that prohibit the trial court from delegating timesharing decisions to third parties. Kiswani is helpful by going as a step further to make clear that retention of “veto power” does not cure otherwise impermissible delegation of judicial responsibility.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

DCF relies on the public to report suspected child abuse. In Florida, everyone is legally required to report suspected child abuse. It is a crime to fail to report suspected child abuse. F.S. 39.205.

DCF receives abuse reports either by telephone or through their website. The phone number to make an abuse report is 1-800-96-ABUSE (1-800-962-2873). The website address for electronic submission of abuse reports is https://www.myflfamilies.com/services/abuse/abuse-hotline.

Any person who makes an abuse report in good faith is immune from liability. F.S. 39.203(1)(a). But sometimes reporters misuse the system to get an advantage in a divorce or paternity case, especially when parent timesharing is involved.

A false report is defined by law to include a report that is maliciously made:

• to harass, embarrass, or harm another person;
• for personal financial gain by the reporter;
• to obtain custody of a child; or
• for personal benefit for the reporting person in any other private dispute involving a child.

It is a crime to make a false report to either law enforcement or DCF. F.S. 837.05, F.S. 39.205(9). DCF may impose fines or refer the matter to the state attorney for prosecution. A person that makes a false abuse report may also be civilly liable for damages and attorney’s fees.

DCF has internal guidelines that supplement statutory law as to whether an abuse report is a “false report.” Obstacles to proving a false report include proving the reporter knew the report to be false when made and that the reporter’s intended purpose for making the report was to harass, embarrass, or harm another person or to get custody of a child.

There is often a gap between what the target of an abuse report knows to be false and what can be proven to be false. Many abuse investigations are closed without verified findings of abuse. This is not the equivalent of a finding that the report was false. Just because the investigator cannot corroborate an incident does not mean the incident did not occur. If, however, the investigator establishes facts that directly contradict the abuse report, then the abuse report would likely be considered a false report.

Malicious intent can also be difficult to prove. A report is not false just because the reporter has conflicting interests with the person who is being reported. There must be sufficient evidence to overcome a defense that the report, though misdirected or based on misunderstanding, was made in good faith.

We have over 15 years of experience representing parents in dependency cases. Call DeVoe Law Firm to assist you with a request for agency action if you are the victim of a false report to DCF or to defend you against allegations of false reports to DCF.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

In Mannella, the Sixth District Court of Appeals recently departed from Florida’s five other appellate courts by declining to hold child support obligors to a heavier burden of proof when seeking downward modification of agreed-upon child support. [1]

Downward modification of child support requires a child support obligor to prove:

1. 1) a substantial change in circumstances
2. 2) not contemplated at the time of the final judgment’s entry
3. 3) that is material, involuntary, and permanent in nature. [2]

Although the burden of proof in family law cases is normally “preponderance,” courts previously held a child support obligor to a “heavier” burden of proof for downward modification of agreed-upon child support. This “heavier” burden only applies when the child support sought to be reduced was initially established by agreement of the parties rather than by the court at a contested hearing or trial. [3]

The Sixth District Court of Appeals reviewed Florida law and found that the concept of the “heavier” burden of proof originated in alimony cases and was incorrectly imported and applied to child support cases. [4]

In 1993, the Florida legislature revised F.S. 61.14, the statute governing modifications, to clear up the matter. The revised statute eliminated any distinction between downward modification of support, regardless of whether initially established by party agreement or judicial determination. Still binding, the statute provides:

When modification of an existing order of support is sought, the proof required to modify a settlement agreement and the proof required to modify an award established by court order shall be the same. [5]

Unfortunately, that did not settle the matter. Confusion was perpetuated by language in Overbey, a subsequent Florida Supreme Court case that again referenced the “heavier” burden, bringing it new life. [6] The Sixth District carefully considered the language in Overbey and found it to be non-binding surplusage. As such, the Sixth District held that F.S. 61.14(7) decisively eliminated the “heavier” burden of proof that courts had been imposing for downward modification of agreed-upon child support, and so the preponderance standard continues to apply.

Court Signals “Heavier” Burden of Proof for Modification of Agreed Alimony

Ironically, in determining that pivotal language by the Florida Supreme Court in Overbey constituted non-binding surplusage, the Sixth District included its own non-binding surplusage questioning whether F.S 61.14, governing modifications, eliminated the “heavier” burden for downward modification of agreed alimony, a view widely accepted by its sister courts.

In Mannella, the Sixth District noted that a “heavier” burden of proof was historically imposed on requests for downward modification of alimony established by agreement of the parties rather than by the court at a contested hearing or trial. [7] The 1993 revision to F.S. 61.14, governing modifications, is routinely cited by Florida courts as having eliminated the “heavier” burden of proof that previously applied to downward modifications of agreed alimony. [8]

The Sixth District observed that the phrase “order of support” as used in F.S. 61.14 is defined by F.S. 61.046(22)(b) to include child support, but not alimony. If so, F.S. 61.14 has no effect on prior law governing alimony modification. That means pre-statutory case law that imposed a “heavier” burden on alimony modification would continue to apply. This would represent a vast departure from governing law in most Florida appellate districts.

Conclusion

The Sixth District departed from its sister courts on two major points in child support and alimony modification cases. First, the Sixth District rejected post-statutory language in Overbey, a Florida Supreme Court case, that appeared to resurrect a “heavier” burden for downward modification of agreed child support as meaningless surplusage. Second, the Sixth District departed from its sister courts by questioning whether F.S. 61.14, the modification statute that eliminates the “heavier” burden in child support cases, applies to alimony cases.

The burden of proof is foundational in divorce and paternity cases and can tilt the court’s ruling for or against you. It is important to consult with an attorney to ensure your case is well-grounded and substantiated.

Michael DeVoe is a divorce attorney in Orlando, Florida practicing contested divorce, uncontested divorce, timesharing, visitation, custody, paternity, child support, injunctions, and other family law cases.

Endnotes

[1] Mannella (2023)

[2] Poe (2011) (citing Pimm 1992)

[3] Arrington (Fla. 1st DCA 2021); Catalano (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); A.G.W. (Fla. 2d DCA 2023); Schmachtenberg (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Knight (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Pohlmann (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)

[4] Tietig (1992); Bernstein (1979)

[5] F.S. 61.14(7) (1993)

[6] Overbey (1997)

[7] Nixon (1967); Ohmes (1967); Fowler (1959); Scott 1973; Bernstein (1986)

[8] Knowlton (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); Dogoda (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Garvey (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Ellisen (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)